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Assuming, arguendo, that the standard of review in this appeal 
is the reasonable and rational standard as asserted by the 
Respondent, even under a reasonable and rational standard of review 
the final agency's finding of just cause for denial of unemployment 
benefits should be reversed.1 The final agency's finding of 
"harm," knowledge and control is clearly not a reasonable and 
rational interpretation or application of the agency's Rules on 
just cause, contravenes the spirit and purpose of the Employment 
Security Act, and is contrary to case law interpreting the Rules. 
I. THE ELEMENT OF CULPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST 
MERELY BECAUSE THE EMPLOYER HAS BEEN HARMED BY 
THE CLAIMANT'S ACTS 
The Rules and case law "require a balancing of harm against 
the employee's prior work record, length of employment and the 
likelihood the conduct will be repeated." Gibson v. Dept. of 
Employment Security, 840 P.2d 780, 785 (Utah App. 1992) [citing Utah 
Admin. Code R475-5b-102(l)(a)(1) (1992)]. In Gibson, an employee 
for US West was discharged for breaching company rules prohibiting 
disclosure of client information. See generally Gibson, 840 P.2d 
780. The employee unknowingly disclosed information about a client 
to the only person in the world who could use the information 
against the client. Id. 
1
 Petitioner contends that the appropriate standard of review 
in this particular appeal should be a correctness-of-error 
standard. See Brief of Appellant as well as Argument IV of 
Appellant's Reply Brief herein. 
1 
The Gibson court reversed the Board of Review's decision 
denying unemployment benefits because the court found that the 
Board had failed to balance the demonstrated harm to the employer's 
interests against the employee's prior work record, length of 
employment and the likelihood that the conduct would be repeated. 
Gibson, 840 P.2d at 785. The Board did not give adequate attention 
to the factors relevant in a determination of culpability. 
Specifically, "the Board failed to discuss the weight, if any, it 
gave to the unintentional nature of the act and [the employee's] 
exemplary work record." Id. (emphasis added). The court held "the 
Board's denial of unemployment benefits was unreasonable in light 
of the broad remedial purposes of and the liberal interpretation we 
grant to the Employment Security Act, and the Board's inadequate 
consideration of the relevant factors in denying unemployment 
compensation." Id. 
Respondent argues that notwithstanding the Gibson holding, the 
courts have ruled that "some conduct may be so egregious and may so 
seriously affect the employer's legitimate interests, that a single 
incident is sufficient to satisfy the culpability element." 
Respondent cites Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Com'n, 700 
P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) and Grinnell v. Industrial Com'n, 732 P.2d 
113 (Utah 1987) in support of this claim. Nevertheless, Kehl and 
Grinnell are easily distinguishable from the case at hand. 
In Kehl, a forklift driver was discharged for a single 
violation of a company rule. She deliberately failed to stop at a 
railroad crossing while carrying a load of explosives. The court 
2 
held that the discharge was "necessary to avoid actual or potential 
harm to the employer's rightful interests." Kehl. 700 P.2d at 
1134. The court quoted specific provisions from the rules which 
must be balanced to determine if the discharge was for just cause: 
A discharge is not necessary "if [the discharge] is not 
consistent with reasonable employment practices [and] the 
wrongness of the conduct must be considered in context of 
the particular employment and how it affects the 
employer's rights." Id. 
In the Grinnell case, a truck driver was discharged for 
violating several company safety rules. The driver had 
deliberately disconnected the road speed governor on his truck, 
drove too fast, and for an excessive length of time. Grinnell, 732 
P.2d 113. He also had ingested marijuana during his last cross-
country trip. Id. at 115. The Grinnell court stated in dicta that 
the driver's conduct in operating the heavy vehicle on the highways 
was one of those instances where a single violation may support a 
just cause termination.2 Id. The court's finding in Grinnell that 
the driver had the opportunity to prevent or control the violations 
further shows that the court considered the intentional nature of 
the act versus the potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests and the wrongness of the conduct in the context of the 
particular employment. Id. 
2
 The detailed factual analysis invoked by the Grinnell court 
shows that the court was conscious of the need to consider the 
wrongness of the conduct in the context of the particular 
employment against the harm to the employer's interests. The 
effect of the court's analysis is to substantiate the Kehl court's 
balancing of factors approach in ruling on a just cause claim. See 
Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Com'n, 700 P.2d 1129, 1134 
(Utah 1985). 
3 
Although a single isolated incidentf if sufficiently serious, 
might justify a denial of unemployment benefits, it is an exception 
to the general rule that benefits will be allowed. Both Kehl and 
Grinnell, howeverf require a balancing of factors in determining if 
a termination based on that single, isolated incident supports a 
finding of just cause.3 
Furthermore, there exists no support in the Rules or case law 
to substantiate Respondent's claim that "harm" and culpability are 
interchangeable terms, or that a finding of harm alone satisfies 
the element of culpability. It is therefore unreasonable and 
irrational that the Board's finding of harm alone could satisfy the 
element of culpability. In fact, the final agency action never 
considered the element of "culpability" as required by its own 
Rules and case law. 
II. THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO 
AN EMPLOYEE WHO'S REFLEXIVE ACT RESULTS IN A 
VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY 
Utah Administrative Code S R562-5b-102.1.b. provides: 
The employee must have had knowledge of the conduct 
which the employer expected. . . . he must reasonably 
have been able to anticipate the effect his conduct would 
have. 
Dissenting from the Board's decision, Judge Lewis 
characterized Petitioner's conduct as a natural, reflexive response 
"to turn slightly when spoken to." (R.82). Such a 
3
 Kehl also found that the employee knowingly violated the 
company rules. 700 P.2d at 1135. In the present case, the actual 
or potential harm to the employer resulted from a reflexive act by 
the employee. An individual who responds reflexively in a 
situation can hardly be held to have knowingly violated a company 
rule. 
4 
characterization is consistent with the undisputed facts that a co-
worker unexpectantly approached Petitioner and began talking to him 
about a work-related matter. (R.54). Petitioner diverted his eyes 
from the crane for "a few seconds" in reaction to the unexpected 
distraction. (R.54). 
Respondent argues, "[Petitioner] understood the necessity of 
the employer's requirement for absolute attention while operating 
the crane completely satisfies the knowledge element." Such an 
interpretation is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the 
Employment Security Act and case law. The provisions of the 
Employment Security Act are to be "liberally construe[d] and 
administer[ed]." Utah Admin. Code R562-2-1.1. The purpose of the 
Rules and guidelines in determining just cause "is to deny benefits 
to individuals who bring about their own unemployment by conducting 
themselves, with respect to their employment with callousness, 
misbehavior, or lack of consideration to such a degree that the 
employer is justified in discharging the employee." Utah Admin. 
Code R562-5b-101. Generally, "[i]n applying these Rules [of the 
Employment Security Act] to individual cases the Department will 
consider the reasonableness of claimant's actions, the totality of 
the employment situation, and whether the claimant has a genuine 
continuing attachment to the labor market." Id. Specifically, 
with regard to the element of knowledge, the Rules require the 
Board to balance various factors and consider the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether knowledge exists. See Utah 
5 
Admin. Code R562-2-1. Respondent's argument that mere knowledge of 
the employer's expectations satisfies the knowledge requirement of 
the Rules is too narrow and restrictive an interpretation of the 
Rules and misconstrues the purpose of the Employment Security Act. 
For example, an inconsistent application of the disciplinary 
rules by the employer is one factor which will ameliorate a finding 
that the employee had knowledge of the employer's expectations. 
See Utah Admin. Code R562-5b-102. l.b.; See also Utah Admin. Code 
R562-5b-101. In the present case, the employer inconsistently 
enforced its disciplinary policy. In an earlier crane incident the 
responsible employee was not fired but merely had her crane 
certification revoked. Respondent claims that the bare fact that 
the employer revoked that crane operator's crane certification was 
clear notice that "carelessness or mistakes in crane operation 
would not be tolerated by the employer." In the June 1, 1993 crane 
accident, the employee who initiated the interchange with 
Petitioner, contrary to company rules, was not disciplined in any 
way. Respondent's claim that carelessness and mistakes were in 
fact tolerated is unfounded. 
In each of these incidents it's not disputed that the 
employees involved were each aware of the company rules, however, 
only Petitioner was held to be absolutely responsible for violation 
of the rules. The other employees who acted contrary to express 
company rules received a more lenient punishment or simply were not 
disciplined in any way. These incidents are proof that the 
employer was arbitrary and inconsistent in its treatment of job-
6 
related incidents. Such an inconsistent application of company 
policies does not support a finding of knowledge. The Board of 
Review's finding that knowledge was present is contrary to the 
agency's own rules and therefore, is an unreasonable and irrational 
decision. 
In addition, "[j]ust cause may not be established when the 
reason for the discharge is based on such things as mere mistakes, 
. inadvertence in isolated instances, . . . etc. These 
examples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the lack of 
knowledge or control." Utah Admin. Code R562-5b-102.2. 
Petitioner's reflexive motion of adverting his eyes from his work 
for a few seconds, when unexpectedly approached by a co-worker, was 
the sole reason for his discharge. Petitioner did admit that he 
made the mistake of losing visual contact with the crane. (R.43). 
However, such a mistake does not satisfy the element of knowledge. 
Moreover, such a mistake or inadvertence in an isolated instance 
can hardly be construed to be the "callousness, misbehavior, or 
lack of consideration" envision by the drafters of the Rules to 
support a finding of just cause. See Utah Admin. Code R562-5b-101. 
The Board of Review's finding that Petitioner had knowledge is 
neither a reasonable nor rational application of the Rules and is 
contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Employment Security Act. 
III. A REFLEXIVE REACTION IS NOT CONDUCT WHICH CAN 
BE CONSTRUED TO BE WITHIN THE POWER OF AN 
EMPLOYEE TO CONTROL 
The Rules provide "the conduct must have been within the power 
and capacity of the claimant to control or prevent." Utah Admin. 
7 
Code R562-5b-102.1.c. Petitioner was operating a crane box when a 
co-worker unexpectantly approached him to speak about a work-
related matter. (R.54). As a result of a "third party," 
Petitioner diverted his eyes from his work for a few seconds. 
(R.54). 
In his dissent, Judge Lewis characterized Petitioner's actions 
as a natural, reflexive response to turn slightly when spoken to. 
(R.82). "Reflex" is defined as "an involuntary action." Webster's 
New World Dictionary 1221 (college ed. 1968). We all reflexively 
respond to a myriad of stimuli. Most are in the form of innocuous, 
nonthreatening stimuli, such as a pat on the back from behind, a 
unexpected remark, etc. The verbal interchange initiated by 
Petitioner's co-worker was an unexpected, innocuous stimulus 
causing Petitioner to unintentionally divert his eyes off his work 
for a few seconds. Such reflexive conduct is not within the power 
or capacity of an individual to control at all times and does not 
embody the callousness, misbehavior or lack of consideration 
punishable under the Employment Security Act. The Board's finding 
that "it was within [Petitioner's] control to do his job 
correctly," is too narrow a characterization of the circumstances 
and too restrictive an interpretation of the element of control. 
The Board's holding that the element of control existed is 
unreasonable and irrational and should be reversed. 
IV. CORRECTION-OF-ERROR STANDARD SHOULD BE USED 
WHEN THE FINAL AGENCY ACTION FAILS TO CONSIDER ALL THE 
LEGAL FACTORS UNDERLYING EACH ELEMENT ESTABLISHING JUST CAUSE. 
Some cases decided by the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
8 
Utah Code S 35-4-5(b)(1) have found that the Industrial Commission 
was granted an apparent explicit discretion to determine whether a 
claimant was discharged for just cause.4 Neverthless, Petitioner 
contends that even if the Industrial Commission has discretion, it 
is not automatic if the agency has promulgated specific 
administrative rules governing the statute. Thus, the limited 
discretion accorded to the Respondent agency under Utah Code §35-
4-5(b)(1) was displaced by the promulgation and adoption of the 
administrative rules on just cause ("Rules"). See Utah Admin. Code 
R562-2-1; See also Lane v. Board of Review of Industrial Com'n, 727 
P.2d 206, 208 n.3 (Utah 1986). The administrative rules on just 
cause now serve as the basis of decision for a claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits. Lane, 727 P.2d at 208 n.3. 
The Rules were "written to explain and clarify the application 
of the [Employment Security] Act." Utah Admin. Code R562-2-1. 
Therefore, the general language of Utah Code S 35-4-5 was replaced 
with the specific standards enumerated in the Rules. Although the 
Industrial Commission is granted the authority to administer the 
Rules, the agency must apply the enumerated factors outlined in the 
Rules to any just cause claim and subsequent ruling. 
In the present case, the Board of Review issued a decision 
devoid of any attention to the various factors underlying each 
element establishing just cause. The Board's failure to consider 
and balance the various statutorily enumerated factors encompassing 
4
 See Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 
(Utah App. 1991): and King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 33, 36 (Utah App. 1993). 
9 
a determination of just cause renders the Board's decision 
arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. Its findings 
of facts and conclusions of law in the case at hand are clearly 
insufficient as mandated by Utah's Administrative Procedure Act. 
In failing to resolve all the elements of just cause before 
rendering a decision, the Board has substantially prejudiced the 
claimant's rights. The Board's erroneous interpretation and 
application of the rules on just cause also has substantially 
prejudiced the claimant's rights. In short, the Board has rendered 
a decision contrary to the expressed standards of the 
administrative rules on just cause and case law interpreting the 
Rules. Therefore, this court should not defer to the Board's 
decision and review this matter under a correction-of-error 
standard.5 
V. BECAUSE PETITIONER'S APPEAL IN THE CASE AT HAND 
INVOLVES UNSETTLED SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF LAW 
AND COMPLICATED ISSUES OF LAN, A WRITTEN DECISION 
SHOULD BE ISSUED RATHER THAN A DECISION UNDER RULE 31 
By an Order of this Court on April 14, 1993, this Court 
assigned this appeal to the Rule 31 Calendar. Since neither party 
requested a Rule 31 assignment, Petitioner does not know the reason 
why the Court assigned this appeal to the Rule 31 calendar. When 
Oral Argument is held on May 17 , 1993, Petitioner requests the 
Court to reconsider its Order issued on April 14, 1993# and to 
5
 Petitioner contends that Kino v. Industrial Commission, 209 
Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah App. 1993) is not dispositive of the 
question as to what standard of review shall be used when an agency 
has promulgated specific administrative rules that limit the 
agency's interpeation of said rules. 
10 
issue a written opinion.6 
Petitioner contends that the Respondent agency is asking the 
Court to make an expanded ruling that is inconsistent with the 
agency's own Rules and case law on the issue of whether "harm" 
alone is sufficient for a finding of "culpability", one of the 
three factors that the employer must show in its burden of proof. 
There exists no support in the agency's Rules or case law to 
substantiate Respondent's claim that "harm" and culpability are 
interchangeable terms, or that a finding of harm alone satisfies 
the element of culpability. Therefore, it is unreasonable and 
irrational that the Board's finding of harm alone could satisfy the 
element of culpability. 
Respondent relies upon Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Com'n. 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) and Grinnell v. Industrial Com'n, 
732 P.2d 113 (Utah 1987) in support of the final agency's action 
denying unemployment benefits to the Petitioner. Both Kehl and 
Grinnell require a balancing of factors, however, in determining if 
a termination based on that single, isolated incident supports a 
finding of just cause. The court in Kehl also found that the 
employee knowingly violated the company rules. Kehl. 700 P.2d at 
1135. In the present case, the actual or potential harm to the 
6
 If the reason this appeal was assigned to the Rule 31 
Calendar is due to this Court's recent decision in King v. 
Industrial Commission. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 33-38 (Utah App. 
1993) which fails to support Petitioner's contention that the 
Standard of Review is a Correction-Of-Error standard, Petitioner 
still maintains even when using the "reasonable and rational" 
standard of review that this appeal raises significant issues of 
law and that the substantive rules of law are unsettled as 
discussed above in the Reply Brief of Appellant. 
11 
employer resulted from a reflexive act by the employee. An 
individual who responds reflexively in a situation can hardly be 
held to have intentionally violated a company rule. Not only did 
the Respondent employer fail to meet its burden of proof in the 
case at hand, the Respondent agency failed to comply with its own 
Rules and case law. 
Hence, these issues are more than uncomplicated issues of law 
and furthermore, the substantive rules of law do not appear to be 
settled. Otherwise, the final agency action by the Respondent 
agency would have affirmed the ALJ's decision and awarded 
unemployment benefits to the Petitioner/Claimant. 
CONCLUSION 
The administrative rules on just cause delineate specific 
factors the Industrial Commission must consider in determining the 
validity of a just cause claim. The agency failed to consider any 
of these factors in its decision. The agency's decision should not 
be accorded any weight and this court should review the agency 
ruling under a correction-of-error standard. 
Respondent has argued that the Board's decision, however, 
should be reviewed under a reasonable and rational standard. 
Assuming, arguendo. such a standard of review is appropriate, the 
Board's denial of benefits based on a finding of harm, knowledge 
and control is nevertheless unreasonable and irrational. 
The Board's failure to consider and balance the various 
statutorily enumerated factors encompassing a determination of just 
cause renders the Board's decision arbitrary and capricious and an 
12 
abuse of discretion. In failing to resolve all the elements of 
just cause before rendering a decision, the Board has substantially 
prejudiced the claimant's rights. The Board's erroneous 
interpretation and application of the Rules on just cause also has 
substantially prejudiced the claimant's rights. In short, the 
Board has unreasonably and irrationally rendered a decision 
contrary to the expressed standards of the administrative rules on 
just cause and case law interpreting the Rules. Therefore, the 
Board's finding of just cause and denial of benefits should be 
reversed and unemployment compensation benefits should be 
reinstated and awarded to the Petitioner. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 1993. 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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